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The second edition of The Embodied Mind supplements the original 1991 text with nearly 50 pages of 
new material: a foreword by leading figure in mindfulness therapy – Jon Kabat-Zinn – and extensive 
new introductions by each of the two surviving authors – Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch. This 
hugely provocative and influential text has certainly earned its republication, and the reader’s 
experience will doubtless be enriched by the new supplementary material. The book is driven by the 
idea of a ‘circulation’ between human experience and the sciences of the mind. Rather than insulating 
our lived experience from emerging insights into the nature of the mind, the authors encourage us 
towards ‘transformations’ that bring our everyday experience into harmony with our best 
understanding of the mind and have far-reaching implications for how we live our lives. Furthermore, 
rather than insulating our scientific inquiry from our everyday lived experience, the authors encourage 
us to achieve experiential insights that will free us from entrenched misconceptions about the nature 
of the mind and its place in the world. 
The book proceeds in five parts. Part I explores the two elements of the targeted circular interaction 
– cognitive science and human experience. Here the authors ally their project with that of Merleau- 
Ponty, though they contrast the phenomenological school’s method of reflection upon experience 
with their preferred meditative method of open-ended mindful investigation. Part II argues that 
although cognitivism has uncovered that there is no unified self, it fails to reconcile this conclusion 
with our lived experience. They propose that the Buddhist tradition offers a deeper appreciation of 
the absence of the self through which we can learn to experience ourselves in an ego-less manner. 
Part III explores the question of how the mind should be understood if not in terms of a unified 
substantial self. The authors draw both on contemporary ideas in biology and cognitive science 
regarding self-organisation, emergent properties and connectionist architecture, and on related 
Buddhist ideas regarding karma and the Wheel of Life. Part IV further develops this new ‘enactive’ 
approach to cognitive science and clarifies their two key conceptual innovations: embodiment and 
enaction. They explain that the concept of embodiment is intended to highlight: 
…first, that cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that come from having a 
body with various sensorimotor capacities, and second, that these individual 
sensorimotor capacities are themselves embedded in a more encompassing 
biological, psychological, and cultural context. (p. 173) 
They go on to explain that adopting an enactive approach means endorsing the claims that: 
(1) perception consists in perceptually guided action and (2) cognitive structures 
emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be 
perceptually guided. (p. 173) 
Their radical claim that the world is not pre-given but enacted expands their groundless conception of 
a mind devoid of ego into a groundless conception of a world devoid of independent objects. Part V 
reflects critically on the place of groundlessness in contemporary Western thought and draws further 
lessons from Eastern traditions. In line with their project’s ‘deeply ethical concerns’ (p. lxvi), the 
authors conclude by reflecting on the ethical implications of their enactive view. 
In his foreword, Kabat-Zinn reflects on the ‘seminal and historic role’ of The Embodied Mind describing 
the book as brave, edgy and rigorous (p. xi). This description is at least partly justified. The book is 
incredibly brave in its scope, encompassing a range of contemporary and historical ideas in 
phenomenology, analytic philosophy, existentialism, cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, 
psychoanalysis, cellular biology, evolutionary theory and various schools of Buddhism. It is also edgy 
in its content, proposing radical reconceptions of the mind, its place in the world and of the entire 
methodological outlook of cognitive science. It is not, however, a text that I would describe as 
rigorous. Though impressive and enticing, the authors’ arguments are deeply muddled in some places, 
and straightforwardly fallacious in others. I will pick out three representative arguments that target 
methodology, the self and the world respectively. 
The first part of the book emphasises the importance of achieving first-person insights into the nature 
of one’s experience. The authors propose that the reflective methods developed in the 
phenomenological school face severe limitations, and that their own preferred approach of open-
ended mindful investigation avoids these shortcomings. A more rigorous examination, however, 
suggests that the gap between the two methods is not as profound as advertised. First, the authors 
exaggerate the extent to which the phenomenological method adopts a theoretical perspective that 
distorts the pragmatic aspects of lived experience, and the extent to which phenomenological findings 
are tainted by background theoretical commitments. Second, they exaggerate the extent to which 
meditative investigation can overcome these impediments. It is well-established that attention 
dramatically alters experience so, as an essentially attentive activity (p. 78), mindfulness will distort 
experience rather than simply disclosing it (Dreyfus pushes a related point in his 1992 review of the 
book). Furthermore, the conclusions reached in the meditative tradition are, like those of the 
phenomenologists, strongly influenced by theoretical concerns and commitments rather than 
reflecting lived experience in a manner untainted by theory. Interestingly, these shortcomings of the 
book’s arguments are conceded in Thompson’s new introduction, though Rosch is a little less 
concessive on this issue. Neither author, however, concedes that there are similar exaggerations in 
their discussion of other themes.  
Consider their extended discussion of the self. The authors argue that cognitivism is committed to the 
non-existence of the self: a conclusion with which they strongly agree. They object, though, that 
cognitive science has failed to provide a viable self-free framework for understanding the mind and 
has ignored the need to incorporate egolessness into our lived experience. These accusations only 
stand up if cognitive science is indeed committed to the non-existence of the self, but this 
commitment is again exaggerated. Various psychological findings do indeed put pressure on the idea 
of a substantial, coherent, unified and stable self that is the source of thought, the centre of perception 
and the origin of action. Although one response to this pressure is to deny the existence of the self, 
another is simply to revise our conception of the self to accommodate these findings. As Dennett puts 
it, the points raised in the book can plausibly be dealt with by reformation rather than revolution 
(1993).  
One important example concerns our naïve conception of the self as an enduring substance that 
persists through all our mental and bodily changes. Various considerations suggest that no such 
substantial entity exists, but rather than concluding that the self is unreal we can adjust our 
understanding so that the self is no longer an enduring substance but instead a certain kind of pattern 
- a ‘perduring’ entity. This kind of view gets short shrift from the authors, who misrepresent it as 
reducing facts about the self to a matter of perspective (p. 65). Our naïve conception of the self also 
regards the self as an essentially conscious entity, yet cognitive science posits unconscious mental 
processes. Again, we might take this as evidence against the existence of the self, or we could simply 
revise our conception of the self to accommodate the fact that we undergo both conscious and non-
conscious processes. The authors again dismiss such a view too lightly, arguing that if mental processes 
can be either conscious or non-conscious then consciousness becomes epiphenomenal (p. 56). This is 
a particularly patent fallacy: the fact that some mental processes can occur non-consciously does not 
entail that any mental process can occur non-consciously. 
This pattern of misrepresenting existing positions also extends to their discussion of the nature of the 
world. The authors highlight the failings of both objectivism – the view that experience discloses a 
wholly mind-independent world – and subjectivism – the view that experience projects properties of 
the mind onto the world. They argue that ‘…Western views have…no methodological basis for a middle 
way between objectivism and subjectivism’ (p. 230) and propose their own middle-way position 
according to which the world is enacted by organisms through a ‘history of structural coupling’ (p. 
200). On this view, there is a mutual dependence between mind and world such that an organism’s 
world is ‘brought forth’ by the activities of that organism. Pursuing a middle-way between objectivism 
and subjectivism is certainly a sensible proposal, but here the authors again exaggerate the distance 
between their own proposal and existing positions.  
They hold that cognitivism is committed to a representational view of the mind, which is in turn 
committed to the objectivist thought that experience ‘recovers’ how the world is in and of itself. This 
disregards the myriad positions in both philosophy and psychology according to which we represent 
‘response-dependent’ properties: that is, worldly properties that are characterised by the responses 
they elicit in certain kinds of organism. When faced with problems about the objectivity of colour – 
problems articulately exposed in Ch.8 of the book – thinkers such as Locke have claimed that being 
red is a matter of having the dispositional property of affecting certain kinds of observer in a certain 
way. The notion of response-dependent properties is prevalent in Western thought, and is even 
compatible with a representational view of the mind, so it is a mistake to hail enactivism as 
revolutionary in its carving of a middle-way between objectivism and subjectivism.  
It might be objected that this common-place notion of response-dependent properties is disanalogous 
to the proposed account of an enacted world. The authors are not merely arguing that certain 
experienced properties only exist relative to certain kinds of organism, but rather that an organism’s 
whole world is ‘brought forth’ by them. I see two ways of reading the proposed enactive view of the 
world. On the first reading, enactivism says that everything we experience is in some sense relative to 
the kind of organism we are. If this reading is accurate, the difference between enactivism and the 
common-place response-dependent view is merely one of degree: most theorists claim that some of 
the properties we experience are organism relative where enactivism claims that they all are. This 
does not mark a radical break from orthodoxy, and might even be read into a number of existing 
theories such as Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. On the second reading, enactivism says not just that 
everything we experience is relative to the kind of organism we are but that there is no mind-
independent world beyond our experience. This view would certainly mark a more dramatic departure 
from orthodoxy, but it is not a view that is justified by the arguments offered in the book. The authors 
do offer an argument from Mahayana philosopher Nagarjuna that what is seen is inseparable from 
the seer and the seeing of it, because it is unintelligible for a sight to exist unseen. This is the kind of 
weak word-play easily unpicked by a keen undergraduate philosopher – a point that the authors come 
close to conceding themselves (p. 223) – yet the argument is nevertheless given credence. The denial 
of a mind-independent world is not just poorly motivated in the book, but hard to reconcile with the 
enactivist framework. It seems we must posit a world that exists independently of the organism to 
make sense of the organism bringing forth a ‘lived world’ through its interactions with it. This comes 
out vividly in the authors’ example of ‘Bittorio’ – a ring of cellular automata that brings forth a world 
of significance through its coupling with ‘…a random soup of 1s and 0s’ (p. 157). Overall then, it is 
unclear that The Embodied Mind has supplied and motivated a revolutionary understanding of the 
world at all. 
The examples offered above are not the only cases in which the authors misrepresent existing views, 
nor are they the only cases in which the depiction of their own view is skewed or unclear. It is worth 
noting that Kabat-Zinn, despite the positivity of his foreword, admits that he didn’t understand most 
of the book on first reading it (p. xi). Similarly, Rosch’s introduction alludes to ‘…twenty years of emails 
from confused readers…’ (p. xxxviii). It would be a mistake, however, to dismiss the whole book as 
unclear and poorly argued. The text packs in an incredible amount of content, so for every poor 
argument there is another that is more convincing, and for every muddled or inaccurate piece of 
exposition there is another that is incredibly clear and informed. More importantly, there is a sense in 
which criticisms of the lack of rigour in some stretches of the book risk missing the point. Consider the 
following statement of the book’s purpose: 
Let us emphasize that the overriding aim of our book is pragmatic. We do not intend 
to build some grand, unified theory, either scientific or philosophical, of the mind-
body relation. Nor do we intend to write a treatise of comparative scholarship. Our 
concern is to open a space of possibilities in which the circulation between cognitive 
science and human experience can be fully appreciated and to foster the 
transformative possibilities of human experience in a scientific culture. (pp. lxiv-lxv) 
A book that is intended to instigate an intellectual revolution in our approach to the mind can perhaps 
be excused for misrepresenting the orthodox views it opposes, and for over-stating the promise of the 
new frontier it signals. A project with this kind of space-opening remit should perhaps be judged not 
by the arguments behind it but by the legacy before it: that is, by the extent to which the world-view 
it preaches has gone on to yield valuable results. Such a retrospective evaluation was, of course, 
unavailable at the time of The Embodied Mind’s original publication, but 26 years on with the 
publication of this second edition we are in a better position to judge it by its legacy. Despite admitting 
his limited understanding of the text, Kabat-Zinn talks about the enormous influence that the book 
had upon his thinking. Perhaps this is representative of the book’s wider influence: even without 
understanding every claim in the book or accepting every argument, many researchers have had their 
thinking moulded by the spirit of the book, and have achieved deeper insights into the mind as a result. 
The two new introductions offer a useful overview of The Embodied Mind’s legacy. Rosch identifies 
some key ways in which the contemporary landscape of cognitive science vindicates the ideas 
proposed in the book. She cites the increased appreciation of: the role of phenomenological 
investigation in the study of the mind; the importance of mindfulness training and the transformative 
experiences it provides, and; the development of enactivist principles in both psychology and 
philosophy. Thompson’s list is a little longer. He notes that researchers have increasingly moved away 
from a stimulus-response model of the brain to models on which brain activity is self-organising, non-
linear, rhythmic, parallel and distributed. He places this in the context of a wider advance in our 
understanding of autopoietic systems. Furthermore, subjective experience is now typically regarded 
as an efficacious aspect of the mind that offers a suitable target for empirical investigation. Meditation 
and mindfulness are now commonly employed in clinical practice and Buddhism is increasingly 
regarded as a valuable player in philosophical debates. Many mental processes are regarded as 
embodied, including abstract mental capacities that are taken to be grounded in motor-perceptual 
processes. Finally, the enactivist principle that an organism’s world is not pre-specified but in some 
sense enacted by the organism has also gained traction. 
Although this legacy is quite formidable, we must also note some of the recommendations that have 
not been so widely taken up. Rosch suggests that mindfulness has not been given the right place in 
contemporary research, and that its scientific investigation has displayed serious shortcomings. She 
also suggests that science has not approached the lessons of Buddhism with an ‘open heart’ but 
instead treated the tradition ‘imperialistically’, incorporating only those insights that are not too 
disruptive to the scientific status-quo (p. lii). Individual experience is still too-often disregarded in 
favour of an impersonal and reductive view of the mind, and there is little appreciation of evidence 
that Rosch takes to indicate the separability of mind and body. Finally, little has been done to extend 
the enactive framework beyond our understanding of the mind to other domains such as symbol-
systems, disease and societal structures. Thompson proposes that more attention should be given to 
enactivism’s radical view of scientific models as ‘…formalised representations of the world as disclosed 
to our embodied cognition.’ (pp. xxvii). He also claims that experience is still erroneously treated as 
an object of scientific investigation rather than unobjectifiable, and suggests that more needs to be 
done to achieve the practical wisdom championed by the book. 
The list of ideas in the book that have not proven successful could be extended further, but what 
should we make of this list? One possibility is that the network of ideas presented in the book form 
an integrated world view. The last 26 years have allowed some nodes of this network to be 
incorporated into the mainstream understanding of the mind, and with a few decades more the rest 
of the network will go the same way and enactivism will become the new orthodoxy. Another 
possibility is that the proposed network of ideas is not as integrated as the authors advertise, and that 
one can pick and choose which claims are worth adopting. On this view, the best components have 
been carved-off, refined and developed over the years while the weaker components have rightly 
been left by the wayside. I’m inclined to favour the latter interpretation: cognitive science has been 
reformed in light of the insights captured by the book, but the full-scale revolution that Varela, 
Thompson and Rosch call for has rightly been resisted. But even if I’m right that not all of the driving 
claims of The Embodied Mind will be proven right, the point remains that the book has an impressive 
legacy that marks it as a valuable contribution to cognitive science and as a text worthy of our 
continued critical attention. 
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